Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1986

The State of Utah v. Norman Haga : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Nancy Bergeson; Attorney for Appellant.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; Attorney for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Haga, No. 198620849.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1403

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
-vCase No. 20849

NORMAN HAGA,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a conviction and judgment of burglary, a
third degree felony and theft, a class B misdemeanor, in
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge, presiding.

UTAH SUPREME COURT
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
|^ p y
45 0
S9
Wfcfr
DOCKET NO £ 0 ® ^

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent

NANCY BERGESON
S a l t Lake L e g a l D e f e n d e r A s s o c .
333 S o u t h S e c o n d E a s t
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 8 4 1 1 1
Telephone:
532-5444
Attorney for Appellant

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
-vCase No, 20849

NORMAN HAGA,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a conviction and judgment of burglary, a
third degree felony and theft, a class B misdemeanor, in
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge, presiding.

NANCY BERGESON
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc,
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
Attorney for Appellant

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of Facts
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1
2
4

ARGUMENTS
POINT I:

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO DISMISS FELONY CHARGES AGAINST
THE APPELLANT AFTER HE HAD BEEN TRIED
FOR A MISDEMEANOR WHICH WAS PART OF
THE SAME CRIMINAL EPISODE AS THE
FELONIES

4

CONCLUSION

12

ADDENDUM A

14

ADDENDUM B

15

ADDENDUM C

16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES CITED
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970)
State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1985)
State v. Sosa, 598 P.2d 342 (Utah 1979)

11
6
12

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Ann. §§76-1-401, -402, and -403 (1953 as
amended)

4-11

Utah Code Ann. §76-1-405 (1953 as amended)

8

Utah Code Ann. §77-35-9(a) (1953 as amended) . . . .

7

OTHER AUTHORITES
1975 Utah L. Rev. 831

10

ii

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1.

Did the District Court err in refusing to dismiss

felony charges against the Appellant after he had already
been tried for a misdemeanor which was part of the same
criminal episode as the felonies?

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
-vNORMAN HAGA,

Case No. 20849

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment against Norman Haga for
burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended), and theft, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as
amended).

A jury found the Appellant guilty following a trial

on July 30, 1985, in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Scott Daniels,
Judge, presiding.

Appellant was sentenced to 0-5 years for the

burglary and 6 months for the theft, the sentences to be served
concurrently at the Utah State Prison.

The court also ordered

these sentences to run concurrently with a one year prison term
Appellant had been sentenced to after he was found guilty of
attempted burglary on June 28, 1985, in the Fifth Circuit Court
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Michael Hutchings, Judge presiding.

Statement of Facts
On June 28, 1985 Appellant was found quilty of
attempted burglary, a Class A misdemeanor.

Following a

bench trial before Judge Michael Hutchings, in the Fifth
Judicial Circuit Court, the Court concluded that the Appellant
had attempted to enter or remain unlawfully, with the intent
to commit a theft, in the building of Dan's Used Cars at 1105
South Main Street, Salt Lake City, at approximately 12:30 a.m.
on April 2, 1985 (R.42).

On July 30, 1985, in a jury trial

before Judge Scott Daniels in the Third District Court, Appellant
was additionally found guilty of burglary, a third degree
felony and theft, a class B misdemeanor.

The jury concluded

Appellant had committed these crimes during the evening of
April 1, 1985 at Progressive Motors on 877 South Main Street
in Salt Lake City (R. 7,22-25).
Appellant was originally charged in a three count information
with burglary, a third degree felony (Count I ) , theft, a third
degree felony (Count II) and attempted burglary, a class A
misdemeanor (Count III) (R. 7-8) (Addendum A ) .

A preliminary

hearing on the three offenses was held on April 18, 1985 before
Judge Paul Grant.

At the close of the hearing the Court found

probable cause to warrant trying Appellant on all three counts.
The Court subsequently ordered the felony counts bound over to
District Court for trial, but severed the misdemeanor count, sua
sponte, and ordered a Circuit Court trial of that count.

The

court severed Count III from Counts I and II because it concluded
that the misdemeanor and felonies did not comprise a single
criminal episode (R. 74-5, 108-9).

On June 20, 1985 Judge Daniels heard and denied Appellantfs
motion to dismiss the felony counts (R. 47-65) .

Appellant

argued that he had been denied a speedy trial when the felony
charges were not bound over to District Court due to a clerical
error.

At the close of Appellant's argument, the state raised

an impromptu motion to rejoin Counts I and II with Count III (R.65).
At the time, Appellant had no choice but to object to the motion
because no one at the hearing, including Judge Daniels, had any
idea why the counts had been severed (R. 66-7).

Defense counsel's

objection concerned the procedural basis for the spontaneous motionscounsel voiced no objection to the substantive issue of joinder (R.
42,66). Consequently, the motion was denied based in part on
defendant's procedural objection (T. 42,43,67). (Addendum B ) .
After reviewing the preliminary hearing transcripts, Appellant
brought a timely motion before Judge Michael Hutchings on the
morning of the Circuit Court trial (June 24, 1985) to rejoin
Count III with Counts I and II (R. 108-20).

Even though the

prosecution had moved for joinder at the hearing before Judge
Daniels on June 20, when Judge Hutchings indicated his
willingness to grant Appellant's motion, the state objected
(R.121) and the court denied Appellant's motion (R.122).

Trial

on Count III resulted in a judgment against the Appellant.
On July 26, 1985 Appellant once again presented a motion
before Judge Daniels to dismiss the felony charges (R. 70)
(Addendum c ) .

Defense counsel argued that prosecution of

the felony counts was absolutely barred by Utah's single
criminal episode statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-1-401 et seq.
(1953 as amended).

Judge Daniels agreed that Appellant's

alleged crimes "establish[ed] separate offenses under a
single criminal episode" (R. 101). The Court nevertheless
denied Appellant's motion, reasoning that Utah Code Ann.
§76-1-402(2) afforded the court the power to prosecute the
felonies, ev^n though improperly severed from the misdemeanor,
"in order to promote justice"(R. 102) (Addendum c ) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred when it refused to dismiss felony
Utahfs single criminal episode

charges against the Appellant.

statute barred the statefs felony prosecution once the Appellant
had been tried for a misdemeanor which, as the District Court
acknowledged, arose from the same criminal episode as the
felonies.

In denying Appellant's motion to dismiss, the court

effectively denied Appellant the protection Utahfs statute
provides against the harrassment that attends senseless and
wasteful multiple prosecutions.

Defense counsel gave the courts

and the prosecution every reasonable opportunity to join the
improperly severed counts.

The state, and not the Appellant,

must pay the price for the prosecutor's inability to ensure
that counts comprising a single criminal episode are jointly
tried.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO DISMISS FELONY CHARGES AGAINST
THE APPELLANT AFTER HE HAD BEEN TRIED
FOR A MISDEMEANOR WHICH WAS PART OF
THE SAME CRIMINAL EPISODE AS THE
FELONIES.
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The staturory provisions relevant to this appeal are
Utah Code Ann. §76-l-4( )] ,- 102, and -403 (] 953 as amended):
76-1-401
"Single criminal episode" defined-Joinder of offenses and defendants.--In this part
unless the context requires a different definition,
"single criminal episode" means all conduct which
is closely related in time and is incident to an
attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal
objective...,

76-1.-402. Separate offenses arising out of single
criminal episode--Included offenses....
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate
offenses under a single criminal episode, unless
the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a
defendant shall not be subject to separate trial s
for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a
s ing1e court, and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting
attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned
on the first information or indictment.

7o-1.-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent
prosecution for offense out of same episode.--(1)
If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode,
a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different
offense arising out of the same criminal episode is
barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense
that was or should have been tried under section
76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and
(b) The former prosecution?
(i I Resulted in acquittal; o:
( i :i ) Resulted in conviction. - .
A!

-

-

court severe J tue misdemeanor count J < oils t >ie two lelon
=»]' charaed '•-• i ^>nqle information, ifter concludino 'he

A:- defense

-t>a..±<.'it the prosecution and the Di

: .
>

Court trial Judge all agreed, the preliminary hearing magistrate
was plainly mistaken in his conclusion.

This appeal, therefore,

does not address whether the burglary, theft and attempted burglary
charged against the Appellant (see p.2,supar) constitute a single
2
criminal episode.
The sole issue before this Court is whether
the trial court, after acknowledging the applicability of
§76-1-403, erred in failing to dismiss the felony charges
against the Appellant.

On a number of occasions during the proceedings below the
prosecution made statements such as: ,f[I]t was just a
travesty to sever the counts," (R. 65) "[tJ here are separate
individuals...therefs different locations...but it all comes
out of the same criminal episode," (R.66) "I want them [the
counts] joined, I've always wanted them joined, I filed them
as a single criminal episode,11 (R. 121). Similarly, the
District Court Judge at one point stated, "As I read the
statute 402, whenever conduct may establish separate offenses
under a single criminal episode, that's clearly the case here."
(R. 101). It should also be noted that in a typical situation
the prosecutor wants joinder and the defense wants severance
of counts; in the present case, however, it was clear that the
evidence of both the felonies and the misdemeanor would come
in at both trials to show defendant's intent.
2
A comparison of the facts in this case with the facts in State
v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1985) (the Court held that a
defendant who had burglarized both an apartment and a laundry
room within a single apartment complex had committed separte
offenses within a single criminal episode) clearly establish
that the crimes charged against the Appellant constitute
a single criminal episode.
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Utah Code A n n . §76-1-402(2) provides that a defendant.
must not be subjected to separate trials for multiple offenses
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free from separate triais <:r. those offenses was abrogated.

Utah Code A n n . §77-35-9(a) (1953 as amended) p r o v i d e s : "A
felony and a misdemeanor offense m a y be charged in the same
indictment or information if: (1) They arise out of a single
criminal episode; and (2) The defendant is afforded a
preliminary hearing with respect to the misdemeanor along
w i t h the felony o f f e n s e . "
4

I t should be noted that Utah Code A n n . §76-1-405 (1953 as
amended) cannot provide a rejoinder to Appellant's present
argument since the requirements of §76-1-402(2) have been m e t .
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When the trial court was faced with Appellant's motion
to dismiss the felony charges against him, it was presented
with precisely the scenario laid out by §76-1-403.

As

the District Court trial Judge readily admitted, the felony
case before it constituted a "subsequent prosecution" that
should have been a part of the prior misdemeanor prosecution
which resulted in a conviction (R. 101-02).

By the court's

own implicit admission, the Appellant's prior misdemeanor
conviction barred the prosecution of the felonies because all
three charges were part of a single criminal episode.

Never-

theless, the court denied Appellant's motion to dismiss.

In

support of its ruling the court reasoned:
...As I read the statute 402, whenever conduct
may establish separate offenses under single
criminal episode, that's clearly the case here.
Unless the Court otherwise orders to promote
justice, a Defendant shall not be subject
to separate trials for multiple offenses. And
then it gives some conditions. And I think that
statute applies. I think that ordinarily
the Defendant would not be subject to separate
trials if multiple offenses arose under the
same criminal episode, unless the Court otherwise
ordered to promote justice.

...I think I have discretion under this section
to otherwise order, in order to promote justice,
and that's what—and that's what I am essentially
doing.
(R. 101-02) . This language indicates that the trial judge
entirely misconstrued which "court" could, on the facts of
this case, properly order separate trials under §76-1-402(2)
because it failed to read that provision in light of §76-1-403
(a).

The latter provision states that a "former prosecution"

will always bar a "subsequent prosecution." when the subsequent
prosecution was for an offense that was or should have been
-^•::

•

<(>)
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severance
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that single criminal episode already gone to trial and resulted

in a conviction or acquital?

If the answer to these two

questions is yes, then the trial court must dismiss the charges
before it.

In the present case, prosecution of the felonies

"was or should have been" joined with the trial of the misdemeanor
because the requirements of §76-1-402 had been met and because
the preliminary hearing magistrate did not sever the counts in
order to promote justice.

Given these facts, the trial judge's

hands were tied and he could nothing other than dismiss
the felony charges against the Appellant.

Judge Daniels' ruling

has clearly undermined the policy and protections furthered
by Utah Code Ann. §§76-1-401 — 403 .
While there are no Utah cases announcing the policy
underlying §76-1-403, from the Appellant's perspective this
provision amounts to a criminal law analogue to the civil law's
5
doctrines of issue and claim preclusion.
Issue preclusion,
or collateral .estoppel, is aimed at precluding the relitigation
of issues determined by a former verdict and judgment.

The

doctrine of claim preclusion bars the litigation or prosecution
of matters which the court determines could and should have been
heard in a former trial.

These doctrines will of course be

applicable in many situations where the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is not.

The doctrines1 purposes are

essentially the same in the criminal as in the civil context.

J

Utah Legislative Survey—1975, 1975 Utah L. Rev. 831, n. 301
indicates that §§76-1-401—405 were drafted in order to improve
"efficiency in the court system,"
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They provide the courts wit. n powerful tools for halting the
drain upon finances, time and energy of the parties, and
prevent the waste of public funds and valuable court time
in a system plagued by crowded dockets.

Especially in

the criminal context, the doctrines shield criminal defendants
from prosecutorial harassment.
In the present case, Judge Daniels' denial of Appellant's
motion to dismiss subjected the Appellant
narassr> *

>:~\- r^i.

strain or a^i. i^ing

4

•.

'

.:

u

o a wide range of

^ ::) tl le nx^nns^r-

n id emoti :na]

ir.ais, wnere the evidence was essentially

the same, instead of OIIL ; !.o was placed in ;i position where he
1^-i red tc • c
a>^oct^u i
no.

Be,*::

:

%

- • l; " - -

.iu irauiiia or two sentencing proceedings rather than
': :,er:ns of the rubJ.c expense and costs to the

been co.ao ^tie Ly lai i a^io^ ^
Appellant's .notic. _

t.ie tri.il court's auniai -J.

J'his Court mubt :orrect such a serious

Writing in concurrance in Ashe v, Swenson, 3 97 U.S. 453 45 4 (19 70) , Justice Brennan said:
...Givei i tl le tendency of modern criminal legislatioi I
to divide the phases of a criminal transaction into
numerous separate crimes, the opportunities for multiple
prosecutions for an essentially unitary criminal
episode are frightening.
In my view, the Double Jeopardy Clause requires the
prosecution, except in most limited circumstances,
to join at one trial all the charges against a
defendant which grow out of a single criminal act,
occurrence, episode,
transaction. This "same
-11-

transaction" test of "same offence" not only enforces
the ancient prohibition against vexatious multiple
prosecutions embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause,
but responds as well to the increasingly widespread
recognition that the consolidation in one lawsuit of
all issues arising out of a single transaction or
occurrence best promotes justice, economy, and
convenience.
Although Brennan's "same transaction" test for determining
what should be joined in a single prosecution has not been
endorsed as a constitutional imperative by a majority of the
Court, it is clear that Uath has adopted the standard as a
matter of local law.

As this Court stated in State v. Sosa,

598 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1979), "[t]he single criminal episode
statute...requires that when a defendant is brought before a
court, all offenses arising from a single incident which are
triable before that court be charged at the same time.

If

separate charges can be joined, they should be joined."
(emphasis added).

Utahfs statute thus mandates that a

prosecutor join all offenses arising out of the same transaction;
when the state fails to comply with its duty to join, as it
did in the present case, then dismissal of all attempted
"subsequent prosecutions" is required.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests
the Court to reverse the two district court convictions against
him and order that the charges be dismissed.
DATED this

Y

day of June, 1986.
Respectfully submitted,

^°^7

/Qe^r

NANCY BERGESOJ
Attorney for/Defendant^
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CIRCUIT C O U R T , STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE C O U N T Y , SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
Screened by: G D'EI.ia
Ass i g n e d to: G D'E1i a
BAIL ..J.2.,_BOO...OO_
OF

THE STA

UTAH

us
NORMflN

09/30/59

HAGA

INFORMATION

Criminal No.

85FS

07f>9

Defendant(s)
(Address/DOB)
The u n d e r s i g n e d
„XJ.iL!l?J-^:_§.LCPD/ Hn-.ia.GkSQ.ri
-....
under o a t h s t a t e s
on i n f o r m a t i o n ancT""belief"' t h a t ' ' ' t h e ~ l l e 7 e n d a n t ( s )
c o mm i 11 e d the c r i i n es o f :
COUNT I
BURGLARY,

/^Q

^
V

a Third
Degree Felony, at 877 South Main S t r e e t , in Salt
I.-ike County, State oi: Utah, on or about April 1, 1985, in
isolation of -itle 7 6 , Chapter 6, Section
202,
Utah
Code
A n n o t a t e d 19 5 3, as a in e n ci e d , in t hat t h e d e f e n d a n i , NORMA M
HAGG,
a
party
to
the
offense,
entered
or
remained
u P 1 auif u 11. y i n t h e b u i 1 d i n g 0 f P r o g r e s s i u e M o t o r s w 11 h t h e
i ntent to cornrnit a theft;

(Con t i n ue d o n page T w o )

Affiant
This information is based on evidence
obtained from the following
witnesses:
J Longson
C Lyman
K Jones
Larry Mathie
frank Fife
Clark Kramer

Authorized
filihg :

Su bs c ribecl..* an ci. v swjjx^-~t o
b e f o rfi&jsnfl A: h is." ^ S _ d a y

o/ $4^H* 985 -

For p r e s e n t m e n t and

County
Deputy

Attorney

INFORMATION
STATE us. NORMAN HAGG
County Attorney # 8 b ~ l ~ 6 6 2 3 0
Page Two

85FS

07f>9

COUN T I I
THEF T,
a Th"ircl Degree Felony, at 877 South Main S t r e e t , in Salt take
County,
State
of
Utah,
on
or
about
April
1,
1985, in
v 1 o 1 a 11 o n o f T i 11 e 7 6 , C h a p t e r 6 , S e c t i o n 4 0 4 , U t a h C o cl e
A •) n o t a t e d 19 5 3, as a in e n cl e cl, i n t h at the d e f e n cl a n t, N 0 K MA
HA GG,
a
par ty
to
the
o f fense,
obtai ned
or
e x e r c i se d
11 n a u 111 o r i z e d
contro1
ou e r
the
property
of
P r o g r i»» s s i u
Mo tor s , w i t h t he purpos e to depriue the owner t hereof , an(J
that the ualue of said property was more than $2E>0.00, but
n ot mo re than $ 1,000.00;
COUNT III
ATTEMPTED BURGLARY, a Class A M i s d e m e a n o r , at 1105 South Main S t r e e t ,
in Salt Lake C o u n t y , State of Utah, on or about April 1,
19R5, in violation of Title 7 6 / Chapter 6, Section 2 0 2 ,
Utah
Code
Annotated
1953,
as
amended,
in
that
the
d e f e n d a n t , NORMAN HAGG, a party Lo (..ho o f f e n s e , attempted
enter or remain unlawfully
in the building of Dan's Used
Cars with the intent to commit a theft;
PROBABLE CAUSE S T A T E M E N T :
Affiant bases this I n f o r m a t i o n on police reports which show on April
I , i c>8b ; U
877 South Main S t r e e t , a business known as Prog res s i u e
Mu I. or s UJ s broken into and taken was property valued at $ 2 5 0 . 0 0 and
less I: h a * l , 0«) 0,00.
I n t e r u i e w w i t h C o r e y L y in an, a Sal t L a k e P o 1 i c
O f f i c e r , stated on same date at 110.S South Main S t r e e t , d e f e n d a n t
was seen on an air c o n d i t i o n e r and appeared to be breaking into a
building
known
as
Dan's
Used
Cars.
On
booking
the
defendant,
property taken at Progressive Motors was found on his person.
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THE DISTRICT

COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE C O U N T Y , STATE OF

THE STAFF Ob" UTAH,

:

PIa i n t i f f ,

DISTRICT
UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:
CASE NO. CR-85-673

vs .

:

NORMAN

HAG A,

:

Defendant.

The
hearing
Both

above-entitled
on

defendant's

ccurioel
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Motion by the State to join the offenses was properly

made before this Court, although actual 'written notice was not
prepared .
2.

Mot ice to the defendant was adequate because the defendant:,

through counsel, agreed

that tne cases should have remained

joined.
3,

This Court denied

the State'-s Motion

to join based

on defense counsel's objections.
4,

This Court ordered that the State's Motion for joinder

be deniai in order to promote justice.

Therefore, ace-, .ding

to Section 76-1-402(2), Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, the
defendant was properly allowed separace trials on the offenses,
although they might have arisen from the same criminal episode.
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^

day of Ai^gus't, 1985.
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ATTEST
H. D I A O N HiVuJLSY
/'"

\

C«/»'fc

ADDENDUM C

-16-

Salt

JUL 1,9 1985

N A N C Y BERGESON (#303)
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lc'ke Legal D e f e n d a n t A s s o c
333 South Second East
Salt Lake C i t v , Utah 84111
Telephone:
532-5444

H. Dixon Winery

£ l e r K 3rd Diet. Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff

MOTION TO DISMISS, AFFIDAVIT
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS,
AND NOTICE OF HEARING

-vCase No. CR85-673
(Judge Scott Daniels)

NORMAN HAGA,
Defendant

Defendant, NORMAN HAGA, by and through his counsel,
NANCY BERGESON, hereby moves this Court to bar the prosecution
of the above-entitled case and dismiss the same under the authority
of Utah Code Ann. §76-1-403 (1) (1953 as amended).
Defendant has previously been prosecuted for an offense
arising out of the same criminal episode as the two offenses in
this case.

(See attached affidavit)

The subsequent prosecution

is barred because the offenses should have been tried in the same
prosecution.

See Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402 (1953 as amended)

Defendant therefore seeks dismissal of this case.
DATED this

/ / day of July, 1985.

VNCY BEROES0N
Attorney for Defendant

N O T I C E

OF

H E A R I N G

TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
You and each of you please take notice that the
above entitled matter will come on regularlv for hearing on
the 26th dav of Julv, 1985, at the hour of 10:30 a.m. before
the Honorable Scott Daniels, Third District Court Judge.
Please govern yourselves accordingly.
DATED this / / day of July, 1985.

fete*
Attorney for/Defendant

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of
the County Attorney, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City,
Utah, this

/ / day of July, 19 85.
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FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Sr»t i ^- County, Utah
NANCY BERCESON (#303)
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

JUL 1:9 1985
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

:

-v-

:

NORMAN HAGA,

:

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

AFFIDAVIT

Case No.

C£ Q5-1? 13

:

)
:
)

ss.

I NANCY BERGESON, being first duly sworn and upon my oath
do depose and state that the following facts are true and correct
to the best of my knowledge and belief:
1.

I represented Norman Haga on his charge of Attempted

Burglary, Case No. 85FS0769, set in front of the Honorable Michael
Hutchings, on June 24 & 28, 1985;
2.

On June 24, 1985 prior to trial, I objected to the

severence of the Attempted Burglary from the two felony counts pending
before this Court on the basis that all three offenses were part of
a single criminal episode;
3.

The County Attorney, Gerry D'Elia, had previously ex-

pressed his belief, to both this Court and the Circuit Court, that
the offenses were part of a single criminal episode;

4.

Based on both parties positions regarding the issue

of joinder. Judge Michael Hutchings offered two options;
5.

One, that the case proceed to trial;

6.

Two, that the case be joined with the two felonies

pending before this Court;
7.

Judge Hutchings asked Mr. DfElia if he would consent

to a joinder of the offenses;
8.

Mr. D'Elia answered he would not and was desirous of

proceeding immediately to trial.
9.

Defendant was convicted of Attempted Burglary, in

violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended).
DATED this

/ / day of July, 1985.

NANCY BERGESQlfi
Attorney for Defendant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN

to before me this

/3-

day of July,

1985.

Residing in Salt Lake County
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